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Abstract
We analyze how direct employee voice affects financial leverage. German law man-
dates that firms’ supervisory boards consist of an equal number of employees’ and
owners’ representatives. This requirement, however, applies only to firms with over
2,000 domestic employees. We exploit this discontinuity and the law’s introduction
in 1976 for identification and find that direct employee power increases financial
leverage. This is explained by a supply side effect: as banks’ interests are sim-
ilar to those of employees, higher employee power reduces agency conflicts with
debt providers, leading to better financing conditions. These findings reveal a novel
mechanism of direct employee influence.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we analyze how direct labor influence affects financial leverage.
Direct forms of employee influence, such as informal speak-up programs, works coun-
cils, and employees on boards, are increasingly outranking traditional ways of labor
representation.1 This transition from indirect labor influence (e.g., via unions) to a
more direct employee voice sharpens the discussion on employees’ role in corporate
governance and presents novel challenges to firms and policy makers alike. How-
ever, in contrast to indirect influence of labor, surprisingly little is known about the
consequences of a direct employee voice for corporate decision making.
We exploit a unique setting that grants employees a direct voice in the firm: the
German law on codetermination. This law was introduced in 1976 and mandates
that the supervisory board of a firm, which is similar to the board of directors, has
to consist of an equal number of owners’ and employees’ representatives. We refer to
this as parity employee representation (PER).2 For the empirical estimation of the
consequences of direct employee influence, this setting has two desirable features.
First, the granted influence is substantial. As employees tend to vote together, they
can even outvote owners if they are divided by disagreement. Second, we can apply
two independent identification strategies based on the law’s introduction and design
because it only applies to firms with more than 2,000 domestic employees. Using
the discontinuity around this mandated threshold as well as the law’s introduction
in a difference-in-differences setting allows us to identify the causal impact of direct
1For instance, Wilkinson et al. (2014) state that “[i]n recent years, diminishing union density in
advanced economies has shifted the form of voice in most organizations and countries from collective
and unionized channels of representation to direct and individualized mechanisms” (p. 3).
2An alternative term for parity employee representation is parity codetermination. We use
both terms interchangeably in this paper. Codetermination in this paper refers to board-level
codetermination, whereas another form of employee voice, i.e., the “Betriebsrat”(or works council)
is also often referred to as codetermination (at the establishment or plant level). Such works
councils can be established in firms with more than five employees and give workers a voice, mainly
with regard to employment conditions such as workplace safety or vacation policies (cf. Freeman,
1991; Freeman and Rogers, 1993; Freeman and Lazear, 1995, for details about works councils). In
our sample, virtually all firms have works councils because we focus on medium-sized and large
firms. Thus, our findings can be interpreted as the effect of board-level codetermination on top of
codetermination by works councils.
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employee power.
Despite its importance in practice, the empirical literature on direct labor influ-
ence is still scarce. Faleye, Mehrotra and Morck (2006) and Kim and Ouimet (2014),
for instance, investigate ownership by employees, but neither analyzes the impact
on financing decisions.3 The literature on labor and financial leverage focuses on
an indirect influence of employees, either via labor unions (e.g., Bronars and Deere,
1991) or legal protection (e.g., Ellul and Pagano, 2015). However, direct influence
via a voice in firms’ governance structure is likely very different from influence via
such indirect channels. Due to their presence on corporate boards, employee repre-
sentatives are well informed and able to exert direct pressure on executive managers.
We hypothesize that their direct voice reduces agency conflicts between banks
and firms. Although employee representatives aim to protect the interests of em-
ployees in the first place, they may unintentionally also represent the interests of
banks. The reason for this is that both employees and debt providers are risk-averse
and have a strong interest in the long-term survival and stability of the firm. If
this hypothesis holds true, we expect firms with PER to have lower firm risk, more
favorable financing conditions, and—as a consequence—higher financial leverage,
compared to firms without PER.
We start by analyzing the impact of PER on financial leverage based on a regres-
sion discontinuity design (RDD) around the threshold of 2,000 domestic employees.
In particular, we compare firms that are slightly above the threshold with those
slightly below. We assume that these firms are similar in all dimensions except
their level of employee representation. As an alternative identification approach, we
use a difference-in-differences (DiD) setting around the law’s introduction in 1976.
Thereby we compare treated firms, i.e., those firms which had to introduce PER due
to the new law to unaffected control firms. We find consistent evidence across both
3Employee stock ownership also grants employees a direct influence in the decision process via
their votes. However, although employee ownership is on the rise, labor’s influence via this channel
is mostly still limited due to low equity stakes, and ownership is likely endogenously determined,
making identification challenging.
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different estimation techniques which shows that financial leverage is about 5% to
10% higher in firms with PER compared to firms without strong employee power.
For the RDD analysis, the identification assumption is that firms cannot pre-
cisely manipulate the number of domestic employees in the interval near the cut-off.
Although manipulation may be theoretically possible, our evidence does not indi-
cate that the threshold is actually manipulated in practice (cf. Atanasov and Black,
2016, p. 97). First, owners and managers are well aware that they cannot avoid
codetermination in the long run if they want the firm to grow. Thus, the real option
value of delaying growth is small. Second, the law exists since 1976, with only minor
changes since then. If there would be evidence for large-scale manipulation, the
legislator would have adjusted the law. Third, the McCrary (2008) test shows that
the distribution of domestic employees is smooth around the threshold. Fourth, we
repeat the analysis for high-growth industries in which a precise manipulation of the
threshold is more difficult and find similar results. We also show that the covariates
are continuous around the threshold. Overall, these tests cannot completely rule out
the possibility of manipulation, but they help to mitigate concerns that this drives
our findings.
To further challenge the validity of our RD strategy, we follow the suggestions in
Angrist and Pischke (2008) and alternatively apply very narrow windows around the
threshold. Using bandwidths of up to 1,900 to 2,100 domestic employees, we find that
the coefficient remains stable. We also apply a non-parametric, local RD estimator
and find very similar results, both in terms of magnitude and statistical significance.
Despite the fact that we already control for the number of domestic employees in all
models, we also conduct placebo tests with randomly chosen thresholds and match
PER and non-PER firms by size (i.e., total assets) to further mitigate concerns that
size differences bias our findings.
Overall, these findings provide evidence for the validity of our RD approach.
However, as mentioned before it is difficult to completely rule out all manipulation
concerns in this setting. Thus, we also present evidence based on a second setting
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in which we exploit the introduction of the law on codetermination in 1976. In this
setting, manipulation may still be possible, but it is less likely a major concern be-
cause i) the threshold of 2,000 was not largely known before the law’s announcement
and ii) adjusting firm size, especially downwards, takes time. Thus, it was difficult
for firms to precisely manipulate their number of domestic employees to avoid PER.
Even if they wanted, many firms very likely could not strategically shrink below the
threshold when the law was introduced because they could not adjust their number
of domestic employees downwards fast enough. In the difference-in-differences esti-
mation we compare changes in leverage of these “treated” firms with that of other
firms that were unaffected by the law. We also show that treated and control firms
have a similar development of financial leverage before the law was enacted (“paral-
lel trends assumption”) and that differences in firms’ size are unlikely to drive our
findings.
We hypothesize that reduced agency conflicts between banks and firms with par-
ity codetermination drive our results. However, an alternative explanation for higher
leverage in PER firms could be related to bargaining power. To investigate whether
our findings are indeed due to an interest alignment effect, we perform several ad-
ditional tests. First, we focus on a possible substitute for PER which also allows
banks to directly enforce their interests: bank ownership. We find that the PER ef-
fect does not exist for firms which have banks as owners based on the RDD analysis.
Furthermore, the impact of changes in the codetermination status over time on fi-
nancial leverage is close to zero for firms with bank ownership. To mitigate concerns
that these findings are biased by endogenously determined bank ownership, we also
exploit the capital gains tax reform in 2000 as an exogenous shock which led to a re-
duction of equity holdings by German banks. Analyzing firms with bank ownership
before the tax reform in a difference-in-differences setting reveals that only those
without PER reduced their financial leverage in the post-event period. For PER
firms, we find no effect. Overall, these three test settings provide strong evidence
for a substitution effect between bank ownership and employee codetermination.
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Second, we analyze the cost of debt and find—in line with the view that employee
power reduces agency conflicts between firms and banks—that firms with higher
employee power have significantly lower loan spreads. Furthermore, these firms
have longer debt maturities and fewer covenants.
A possible channel for this interest alignment effect is lower firm risk. To shed
light on this possible channel, we start by analyzing firms’ investment decisions, i.e.,
their M&A deals and capital expenditures. In line with our expectations, we find
that, compared to firms without PER, codetermined firms are less likely to conduct
M&A deals. Furthermore, they tend to focus on value-increasing deals if they engage
in M&A activities. Moreover, we demonstrate that cash flows and profits of these
firms are less volatile. Lastly, firms with PER also have lower idiosyncratic risk.
Thus, higher stability of codetermined firms provides a possible explanation for
their interest alignment with debt providers.
Although this paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first study to focus on
the effects of parity codetermination on financial leverage, others have also analyzed
the consequences of German codetermination. This literature goes back at least to
Jensen and Meckling (1979), which analyzes the problems surrounding the role of
labor in the firm for a variety of structures including codetermination in which man-
agement participation by labor is required by law. Jensen and Meckling (1979) argue
that labor may have objective functions and incentives that are different from value-
maximizing shareholders and discuss the implications of labor voice for valuation,
productivity, and governance, which frames the whole subject for much subsequent
research. The majority of the existing studies on German codetermination focus on
performance and valuation implications (e.g., Baums and Frick, 1998; Gorton and
Schmid, 2004; Fauver and Fuerst, 2006) or productivity (e.g., Svejnar, 1981, 1982;
FitzRoy and Kraft, 1993). The prior work most related to our study is Benelli,
Loderer and Lys (1987), which investigates how codetermination affects corporate
operations and performance using an event study framework. Although not their
focus, the authors also look at the effect of codetermination on risk-taking. These
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results, while directionally in line with our finding, are “very weak and rarely sta-
tistically significant” (Benelli, Loderer and Lys, 1987). In contrast, the use of the
regression discontinuity methodology in our study allows us to use data from more
than just the period around the law’s introduction, significantly increasing our sam-
ple size. Our empirical findings provide clean, strong evidence for a significant effect
of PER on financial leverage and firm risk. Moreover, we go a step further and shed
light on the channels through which PER affects leverage. By analyzing the role of
banks, debt characteristics, and M&A activities, we are able to identify the interest
alignment effect, a novel channel that connects labor interests to bank interests.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the
labor regulation context in Germany as well as theoretical considerations and our
empirical strategy. The dataset is presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we show the
results for the relationship between PER and financial leverage. We also investigate
the necessary assumptions for the identification strategy and the general robustness
of the results. We shed light on interest alignment between banks and firms with
PER in Section 5 and possible channels for such alignment in Section 6. Finally,
Section 7 concludes by summarizing the findings and their implications.
2. Setting
2.1. Parity employee representation in Germany
The regulation of labor differs across countries (e.g., Botero et al., 2004). In this
paper, we focus on Germany as a country with a rather stringent labor regulation.
In general, public companies in this country have a two-tier board system with a
management board and a supervisory board (“Vorstand” and “Aufsichtsrat”). The
former consists of executive managers who are responsible for the daily business.
The members of the supervisory board have, among others, the duty to supervise
the executive managers (§111, 1 AktG). Furthermore, they elect the members of the
management board for at most five years, with the possibility of re-election (§84,
1). Although the supervisory board has formally no influence on daily firm policy,
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this provides them with an effective mean to influence managers’ decision making: if
they are not satisfied, they can deny managers’ re-election. Overall, the supervisory
board has a similar role as the board of directors.
Employee representation on corporate boards of German firms is regulated by
the law on codetermination (“Mitbestimmungsgesetz”, MitBestG). The roots of
this law go back to at least the post-World War II years. In 1951, the “Montan-
Mitbestimmungsgesetz” granted employees in the iron and steel industry a voice in
their firms’ governance structure. In 1976, the law on codetermination came into
force and extended employee representation to all industries (a more detailed de-
scription of the history of the law and it’s introduction is presented in Section 2.3.2).
Since then, there have been no fundamental changes or major reforms of the basic
aspects of this law.
This law mandates that 50% of a firm’s supervisory board seats belong to em-
ployee representatives, who are elected by the firm’s employees. However, it applies
only to firms (both public and private) with more than 2,000 domestic employees
(§1).4 For the calculation of the number of domestic employees, all firms within
one group of companies, i.e., those of the parent company and all subsidiaries are
considered (§5). For firms which exceed this threshold, the law mandates that the
supervisory board has to consist of an equal number of owners’ and employees’ rep-
resentatives (§7).5 We refer to this equality as parity employee representation (PER)
or parity employee codetermination in this paper.6
4To the best of our knowledge, no other legally mandated change happens at the threshold of
2,000 domestic employees. Some firms are exempt from the law (§1, 4). In our dataset, this is only
relevant for firms which focus on news reporting, e.g., publishing companies, which we drop from
the sample (see Section 3.1).
5The chairman of the board is elected by the owners’ representatives, whereas the employee
representatives elect the vice-chairman (§27). As the chairman has two votes in case of a tie,
owners have slightly more power than employees (§29). However, in reality this is often not the
case because employee representative tend to vote en bloc, whereas different owners often have
heterogeneous voting behavior.
6Companies with up to 2,000, but more than 500 domestic employees are regulated by the one-
third codetermination law (“Drittelbeteiligungsgestz”, DrittelbG). This law states that one-third of
the supervisory board has to consist of employee representatives. However, the power of this law
is much weaker if compared to the MitBestG due to several reasons: (i) one-third codetermination
can more easily be ignored by owners’ representatives than parity codetermination, (ii) the law does
not apply to some legal forms (e.g., to the GmbH & Co KG), (iii) employees of other firms in the
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Several studies analyze performance consequences of codetermination in Ger-
many. Theoretically, PER can increase performance, e.g., due to higher commit-
ment of employees or because employee representatives posses superior information
about employees and improve resource allocation within the firm (Berk, Van Bins-
bergen and Liu, 2014). On the contrary, codetermination can also be detrimental
to performance, e.g., because of rent-seeking behavior of employees. For instance,
Kim, Maug and Schneider (2015) show that codetermination protects skilled workers
against layoffs during industry shocks. The empirical evidence on codetermination
and profitability is mixed and inconclusive (e.g., Fauver and Fuerst, 2006).7
2.2. Theoretical considerations and related literature
Our empirical setting is different from most of the prior literature along two
dimensions. First, the majority of the literature focuses on an indirect influence of
labor on firm policy, e.g., via industry-level unionization. By contrast, we investigate
a direct influence of employees on corporate decision due to their representation on
the firm’s supervisory board. Second, we study a setting with a legally mandated
shift of power. In particular, the increase in employee power goes along with a
reduction of owners’ power as supervisory board seats are reallocated from owners
to employees in firms with PER.
Prior literature on the relationship between financial leverage and employee
power mainly focuses on two perspectives: bargaining and employment protection.
The bargaining literature argues that firms use debt as a strategic bargaining tool.
In this perspective, firms increase leverage, for instance, before wage negotiations
with employees to improve their bargaining position. Theoretical and empirical evi-
group of companies are not necessarily considered (§2, 2 DrittelbG). The last two aspects allow
firms to strategically avoid one-third codetermination. These possibilities do not exist for parity
codetermination (Rieble, 2006).
7Valuation and performance consequences of labor power have also been studied outside Ger-
many. For example, Faleye, Mehrotra and Morck (2006) investigate various dimensions and find,
among others, that labor-controlled firms have lower firm value. Ginglinger, Megginson and Waxin
(2011), however, find that employee directors increase firm valuation and corporate performance.
Another strand of the literature focuses more generally on the relationship between labor regulation
and economic outcomes (e.g., Botero et al., 2004) or the relationship between workers and managers
(e.g., Pagano and Volpin, 2005; Atanassov and Kim, 2009).
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dence for this view is, among others, provided by Bronars and Deere (1991), Perotti
and Spier (1993), or Matsa (2010). Ellul and Pagano (2015) extend this view by in-
corporating the seniority of employees’ claims in default and their rights during debt
renegotiation. According to the bargaining argument, higher employee power due to
PER is generally expected to lead to higher financial leverage as managers may try
to increase their bargaining power over employee representatives by reducing firms’
financial slack.8
The second perspective is related to employment protection. The main idea is
that higher financial leverage reduces employees’ job safety. Consequently, employees
prefer lower levels of debt to reduce the probability of financial distress. Berk,
Stanton and Zechner (2010) show in their theoretical model that bankruptcy costs
borne by employees play a significant role in counterbalancing the tax benefits of
debt. Empirical support that the human costs of bankruptcy are economically highly
important is provided by Graham et al. (2015). Several consequences emerge from
this perspective. First, firms’ institutional environments, e.g., the level of labor
protection or unemployment benefits, may affect their debt-equity choice. Simintzi,
Vig and Volpin (2015), for instance, study reforms increasing employment protection
and find that their impact on leverage is negative. Second, firms with higher levels
of debt may attract less (qualified) employees and pay higher wages to compensate
workers for higher probability of financial distress (Chemmanur, Cheng and Zhang,
2013). Thus, firms may want to maintain lower levels of debt in order to be more
employee friendly (Bae, Kang and Wang, 2011). Additionally, employees with high
power may try to increase their job safety and demand insurance against adverse
8Due to the direct influence of employees, the use of debt as a strategic bargaining tool may be
less likely in our setting. There are three reasons for this. First, employee representatives on the
supervisory board have the duty to monitor executive managers (§111, 1 AktG). If debt levels are
high and employees are concerned about their jobs, their representatives are more likely to monitor
executive managers tightly. Thus, executive managers have incentives to choose conservative debt
levels to escape tight monitoring. Second, employee representatives can threaten executive managers
with not re-electing them if they disagree with the firm’s financial policy (§84, 1). Third, the
representatives of the employees possess insider knowledge about the firm’s need for debt because
they have the right to inspect the firm’s internal documents (§111, 2). Thus, it is difficult for
managers or owners to push debt levels excessively high in order to improve their bargaining position.
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firm shocks (Guiso, Pistaferri and Schivardi, 2005; Ellul, Pagano and Schivardi, 2015;
Kim, Maug and Schneider, 2015). According to this perspective, higher employee
power may also enable them to “force” firms to reduce risk by choosing lower levels
of financial leverage. Thus, the employment protection perspective predicts that
firms with PER should have lower levels of financial leverage.
In this paper we also consider a third perspective that may be highly relevant in
a setting where employees have a direct voice in a firm’s governance system: interest
alignment between firms with parity employee representation and banks. Besides the
general monitoring of the board (Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach, 2013), employee rep-
resentatives may unintentionally engage in cross-monitoring for banks as both stake-
holders are risk-averse and mainly interested in the survival of the firm. Monitoring
is a core task of banks (e.g., Campbell and Kracaw, 1980). However, monitoring is
also costly, and firms with too high monitoring cost may face problems to obtain
credits (e.g., Williamson, 1987). Nevertheless, banks are generally assumed to have
a cost advantage of monitoring compared to public debt holders, e.g., because they
have (limited) access to inside information. Such cross-monitoring by banks may
diminish “duplicative monitoring and bonding costs of other debtholders” (Datta,
Iskandar-Datta and Patel, 1999, p. 436) and reduce firms’ bond yields.9
A similar cross-monitoring effect may also occur with employee representatives.
Unlike banks engaging in monitoring for public debt holders, banks now profit from
monitoring activities by employee representatives as they unintentionally take over
part of the monitoring for banks, which reduces banks’ monitoring cost. As manages
have no influence on the appointment of employee representatives, their monitoring
may be especially valuable (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). The reason why the
employee representatives unintentionally take over part of the monitoring by banks
is that their preferences are similar. In contrast to equity holders, both banks and
workers are often regarded as being risk-averse stakeholders (e.g., Ratti, 1980; Gor-
9Furthermore, firms can use their transactions with banks to build a good reputation before
entering public debt markets (Diamond, 1991).
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ton and Schmid, 2000; Berk, Stanton and Zechner, 2010) who have fixed claims:
workers receive their wages and other contractual benefits like pensions, and banks
receive interest and debt repayment as long as the firm is not in default. Thus, both
have large incentives to influence firm policy in a way that reduces firm risk and
the probability of insolvency.10 In particular, equity holders may prefer high-risk
investment projects (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, neither employees
nor banks directly profit from these risky investment projects, but both suffer from
reduced job safety and increased probability that debt repayments fail. Thus, both
stakeholders prefer less risky investments.11 Empirical evidence for lower risk tak-
ing of employee-controlled firms is, for instance, provided by Faleye, Mehrotra and
Morck (2006). Furthermore, employee representatives may help to prevent man-
agerial myopia and an excessive focus on short-term gains (e.g., Stein, 1989), also
beneficial to banks which are more interested in the long-term survival of the firm
than in short-term optimization. Cross-monitoring by employee representatives may
be especially valuable due to their direct voice and high level of insider knowledge
which enable them to effectively enforce their and the banks’ interests; in fact, their
possibilities to affect firm policy (e.g., by threatening managers to deny re-election)
are much higher than for banks.
Consequently, we expect an interest alignment between firms with PER and
banks. This leads to several testable predictions: first, we expect firms with PER
to have lower firm risk, i.e., to engage less in M&A transactions, exhibit less cash
flow and profit volatility, and less idiosyncratic firm risk. Second, similar to legal
environments which protect banks’ interests better (Bae and Goyal, 2009), such
10However, the interests of employees and banks may diverge if the firm is close to insolvency.
In general, banks prefer increasing liquidation value, whereas workers want to avoid liquidation
and ensure going concern. However, the interests of banks may still be more aligned with those of
employees, if compared to owners (who lose power relative to employees in PER firms). Furthermore,
the German insolvency law aims at firm survival, and workers in Germany are comparatively well
protected in case of insolvency due to state insurance (Ellul and Pagano, 2015). In case of insolvency,
German law mandates that an insolvency administrator takes control of the firm; as the supervisory
board has no control over the insolvency administrator, its power is very limited after insolvency
application.
11Chen, Kacperczyk and Ortiz-Molina (2012) who find that firms in more unionized industries
have lower bond yields also argue that workers may reduce the default probability.
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cross-monitoring may lead to more favorable financing conditions (e.g., lower interest
rates and longer maturities). Less information asymmetry may also reduce the need
for restrictive covenants ex-ante. Furthermore, direct bank ownership, which was
not uncommon in Germany, is a substitute to cross-monitoring in this perspective
(Gorton and Schmid, 2000). Regarding financial leverage, we expect that these
supply side effects and lower (expected) cost of financial distress lead to higher
financial leverage. Thus, higher leverage in this perspective is more an indirect
consequence rather than a direct effect of employee representation.
To summarize, we examine three perspectives on how employee power may af-
fect financial leverage. Both the bargaining and the interest alignment perspectives
predict a higher financial leverage in firms with PER. However, the underlying mech-
anisms are different: we expect more favorable financing conditions and lower firm
risk only for the interest alignment perspective; according to the bargaining per-
spective, we would expect no or even a negative effect on financing conditions due
to above-optimal levels of debt. The job safety perspective predicts lower finan-
cial leverage. Which of these three perspectives dominates remains an empirical
question.
2.3. Empirical strategy
Endogeneity is a major concern for empirical finance research in general (Roberts
and Whited, 2013). In the context of corporate boards, the main concern is that
their composition may be endogenously determined (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach,
2003). Our identification strategy is twofold: first, we apply a regression disconti-
nuity design around the threshold of 2,000 domestic employees. Second, we conduct
a difference-in-differences analysis around the introduction of the law on codeter-
mination. Neither of these two estimation methods is completely free of possible
concerns. Thus, combining these different methods which both have their strengths
and weaknesses enables us to better understand the causal impact of employee power
on financial leverage.
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2.3.1. Regression discontinuity design
We first apply a regression discontinuity design (RDD). Such designs have been
frequently applied in empirical finance research. A detailed discussion of this method-
ology is, among others, provided by Lee and Lemieux (2010). In this paper, we
exploit for identification that German firms have to establish parity codetermina-
tion by law as soon as the number of domestic employees (DE) exceeds 2,000. This
setting ensures that the establishment of parity codetermination is not a voluntary
decision of the firms’ owners or managers.12 Rather, German law mandates that
PERi,t =

1 if DEi,t > 2000
0 if DEi,t ≤ 2000,
(1)
where i indicates firms and t years. The law mandates that firms have to start the
election process for a new supervisory board if they realize that they have crossed the
threshold (§37 MitbestG and §§97, 98 AktG). Because the final number of domestic
employees is usually only known after the fiscal year and the complicated election
process for employee representatives, there may be a small time lag between crossing
the threshold and the actual board adjustment. Indeed, we find that 94.4 percent of
our observations are in line with the law’s regulations if we allow for an adjustment
period of up to one year; with an adjustment period of up to two years, this increases
to 96.2 percent. These figures show that the threshold variable and the PER status
are nearly perfectly collinear, which allows us to estimate a standard RD model.
For the empirical estimation, we follow a parametric strategy and limit the sam-
ple to firms with around 2,000 domestic employees. For most tests, we use a range
of 1,500 to 2,500 employees. The choice of this range is a tradeoff between accuracy
and number of observations. This range results in 103 firms and 385 firm-years in
our main models. Alternatively, we also apply narrower windows of up to ± 100
domestic employees and conduct non-parametric, local estimation in the robust-
12Firms with up to 2,000 domestic employees could voluntarily establish parity codetermination.
This is, however, very unlikely as it would require that the firms’ owners voluntarily reduce their
power on the supervisory board.
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ness Section 4.3. Our main model to estimate the causal effect of parity employee
representation on leverage is
Levi,t = κ+β ·PERi,t−1+τt+~ν · ~Zi,t−1+
4∑
p=1
γp ·Api,t−1+
4∑
p=1
δp ·Api,t−1 ·T0|1+i,t (2)
where the assignment variable Ai,t−1 equals the number of domestic employees
minus 2,000, κ is a constant, Zi,t−1 is a vector of firm-specific, time-variant and time-
constant control variables (e.g., firm size and industry), and A is the assignment
variable. In our case, this is the number of domestic employees minus 2,000, i.e.,
we center it at the threshold. We include the assignment variable as polynomials
of degree four. This functional form controls for any direct impact of domestic
employees on leverage around the threshold. Lastly, we interact the assignment
variable with a dummy T which equals one if the number of domestic employees
exceeds 2,000 to control for a potentially different effect of the number of domestic
employees on leverage on both sides of the threshold. The coefficient which we are
mainly interested in is β. This captures the discontinuous effect of parity employee
representation on leverage at the threshold. Results can be found in Section 4.1.
An important identification assumption is that firm do not precisely manipulate the
threshold. For example, firms may strategically stay below or the threshold of 2,000
domestic employees. We discuss and test this assumption in Section 4.2.
To summarize, we focus on firms with between 1,500 and 2,500 domestic em-
ployees (“bandwidth”). We include the centered number of domestic employees
up to polynomial four as controls (“functional form”). We also allow for a differ-
ent functional form on both sides of the threshold. This functional form captures
the continuous effect of the number of domestic employees (“assignment variable”)
on the outcome variable leverage. The discontinuous effect (i.e., the jump) at the
threshold is thus captured by the coefficient for PER.
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2.3.2. Difference-in-differences analysis
For the difference-in-differences (DiD) analysis, we exploit the introduction of the
law on codetermination in 1976. An important question in this context is why this
law was introduced and whether there was lobbying. In line with the perspective that
interests between banks and codetermined firms may be aligned (cf. Section 2.2),
banks may have lobbied for the introduction of the law. Although this would not
necessarily render our findings invalid, a more careful investigation of this potential
identification concern is important.
The intellectual history of the law has three pillars:13 Socialist and Marxist ideas,
the Catholic and Protestant church, and Liberalism. Inspired by socialist ideas which
date back to the 19th Century in Germany, the concept of workers having a voice in
firms’ governance appeared in the party programs of the Christian Democratic Union
(CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) shortly after World War II. Similar
ideas were mentioned by the Catholic and Protestant Church. Representatives of
liberalism also supported employee codetermination in the early 20th century, which
had a strong influence on the 1971 party program of the Free Democratic Party
(FDP). These three pillars led to a widespread thinking in Germany that workers
should be given a voice in their firms. The political history of the law dates back
at least to (unsuccessful) attempts to establish employee codetermination in the
mid-19th century. Several decades later, a new trade regulation act under Wilhelm
II and a law on works councils during the Weimar Republic (early 20th century)
formed the starting point for employee codetermination in Germany. After World
War II, the influence of unions increased substantially as they were needed for the
rebuilding of the German industry. As reward for their efforts and cooperation,
the unions demanded that employees should be given a voice in firms’ governance.
This finally led to the Montanmitbestimmungsgesetz in 1951 which mandates that
supervisory boards in the Montan industry (e.g., iron and steel) must consist of an
13The description of history the law on codetermination follows Raiser, Veil and Jacobs (2015),
pp. 2-5.
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equal number of employee and owner representatives.
The general law on codetermination which we analyze in this paper goes back to
the 1970s. A first draft for the law which would cover all industries was presented
by the governing parties SPD and FDP in 1974. The law was passed by the German
Parliament on March 18, 1976 and became effective on July 1, 1976. Regarding the
threshold of 2,000 domestic employees, Raiser, Veil and Jacobs (2015) explain that
the “political and scientific discussion considered mainly 1,000 to 2,000 employees,
whereby the SPD, the CDU, and the DGB [German Federation of Trade Unions]
considered 2,000 employees [...]” (p. 47) . Furthermore, they state that the reason
for the final decision to use 2,000 employees was that only firms above that size
have a sophisticated enough organizational structure to establish codetermination
effectively. Thus, although we cannot completely rule out that there was bank
political influence involved, there is little evidence that the law was passed due to
lobbying activities, e.g., by large banks.
The legislator allowed for a two-year transition period. For most companies,
the election of the supervisory board members had to follow the new law for the
first time in 1978. During this introduction period, however, there was considerable
uncertainty whether the law would persist as different parties (including employer
associations) filed a constitutional complaint. They argued that the law would
violate the German Constitution. On March 1, 1979, the German Constitutional
Court ruled that the law was valid and affected firms had to implement parity
codetermination accordingly.14 Thus, the introduction period starts in 1976 and
ends in 1979. We analyze windows of plus/minus two, three, and four years around
the introduction period; the introduction period itself is not considered. We define
all firms which have introduced PER after the end of the introduction period as the
treated group. The control group consists of firms which did not introduce PER
14By then, it was not clear how the court would decide. For instance, Wesel (2004) states that
rarely a decision of the court was expected with such high tension. In a similar vein, the German
news magazine “Spiegel” wrote on March 5, 1979 that German politicians were very excited before
the court’s decision and called the date “history-making” in the run-up. See Baums and Frick
(1998) for more details on the court’s decision.
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and firms related to the manufacturing of iron and steel, because codetermination
was already established in 1951 for this so-called “Montan” industry. To reduce
size differences between treated and control firms, we use an equal number of size-
matched control firms (based on total assets in 1975) in our main specification.
Alternative matching approaches are also presented. The applied DiD specification
with firm-fixed effects is as
Levi,t = αi + β ·Postt ·Treatedi + γ ·Postt + δ ·Treatedi + τt + ~ν · ~Xi,t−1 + i,t, (3)
where Levi,t is the leverage of firm i in year t, αi are firm-fixed effects, Postt equals
one after the year 1979, Treatedi equals one for the treated group and zero for the
control group, τt are year-fixed effects, ~Xi,t−1 is a vector of firm-specific, time-variant
control variables (e.g, firm size), and i,t is the error term. Firm and year-fixed effects
absorb the time-constant treated dummy as well as the post dummy in the empirical
estimation. Results are presented in Section 4.6 and important assumptions for their
validity such as parallel trends are tested in Section 4.7.
3. Data
3.1. Sample construction
Our main sample, which we use for the RD analysis, contains private and public
German firms. It is based on data from Hoppenstedt GmbH, a commercial provider
of business information for German firms. For its compilation, we rely on data
from their online database, which provides comprehensive coverage of the majority
of German firms since 2005. We start with all medium-sized and large firms for
which consolidated financial statements (“Konzernabschluss”) are available. We
exclusively focus on consolidated statements because the consolidated number of
domestic employees is relevant for the law on codetermination (§5 MitbestG). Firms
without consolidated statements are ignored. In the case of business groups, we
only consider the highest entity and exclude all other firms within that group, even
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if these other firms publish consolidated financial statements themselves; subsidiaries
without consolidated financial statements would be automatically excluded in the
previous step. We further drop firms from the financial service industry, those
focusing on news reporting (because they they are exempt from the law), and state-
owned enterprises.
Our identification strategy is based on the discontinuity around the threshold
of 2,000 domestic employees. As explained in Section 2.3, most of our tests are
conducted for firms with between 1,500 and 2,500 domestic employees. For the con-
struction of this sub-sample, we have to identify the number of domestic employees
for each firm-year. Although there is a data field for the number of total employees
in the Hoppenstedt database, this information is often missing. Thus, we manually
complete this information for firms which are likely relevant for our analysis.15 After
that, we manually classify a firm’s codetermination status and construct the dummy
variable per. As a last step, we drop firm-years in which the PER status changes
and years with zero or negative equity. The final RDD sample of firms with between
1,500 and 2,500 domestic employees contains 385 firm-years from 103 firms between
2005 and 2013.
In addition to the RD analyses, we also investigate how leverage changed due to
the introduction of the law on codetermiation. For this sample, we require data back
to 1972, i.e., four years before the introduction of the codetermination law in 1976.
The main data source for this sample is books—the so-called “Aktienfu¨hrer”—which
were published annually by Hoppenstedt or Saling since the 1950s. These books
cover all companies with stocks traded at any exchange in Germany. Available
information includes the firms’ names, their business description, and basic balance
sheet and profit and loss statement items (e.g, total assets, profit/loss, total debt
15In particular, we search for this number in annual reports for all firms with more than 1,000 and
fewer than 6,000 total employees (because a fraction of less than about 50% domestic employees
is not very common) if the information is missing. Firms’ annual reports are obtained from their
websites and from the Hoppenstedt database, which also includes reports from firms no longer in
existence. As explained before, the consolidated number of domestic employees is relevant for the
law; thus, we only consider consolidated statements and ignore unconsolidated statements.
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and equity). Most importantly for our purposes, the books also include the names of
the firms’ supervisory board members and their classification as owner or employee
representative.16 From the universe of all firms covered by the books, we drop
those which do not have their headquarters in Germany, financial firms, companies
focusing on news reporting, firm-years with a change in the PER status, and firm-
years with negative or zero equity. The final law introduction sample covers 1,380
firm-year observations from 203 firms between 1972 and 1983.
3.2. Leverage and control variables
Our main leverage measure is based on book values of debt and equity because
the RDD sample also includes private firms. Thus, leverage is defined as total
debt divided by total debt plus book value of equity. Total debt includes current
and long-term liabilities and excludes provisions and accruals. Several control vari-
ables are included in our analysis. For all samples, we have information on firms’
size, which is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets, and roa, defined
as earnings divided by total assets.17 For the RDD sample, we have more detailed
financial statement data, which allow us to construct several further control vari-
ables. tangibility is long-term tangible assets divided by total assets. As a proxy
for growth opportunities, we include Tobin’s Q (tobq). As our sample also covers
private firms, we use the median of this variable in an industry and year. Further-
more, we also control for listing, which equals one for public firms and zero for
private companies. In the German environment, both local or international GAAP
are used. Thus, we include accounting standard, which equals one for interna-
tional accounting standards. Industry-fixed effects are based on the Fama/French
38 industries classification. We winsorize the variables at the 1% and the 99% level
to restrict the impact of outliers. Detailed definitions of all variables as well as their
16The annual versions of the book are accessed in digital form via the library of the University
of Mannheim. We rely on extracted data from their database for the years 1979 and later. Before
1979, we hand-collect the required information from the books.
17Due to data constraints, we use net income for the law introduction sample and EBIT for the
RDD sample.
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sources are shown in Appendix A. Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 1.
— Table 1 about here —
4. Leverage
4.1. Regression discontinuity analysis
Before we investigate the relationship between PER and leverage in a regression
discontinuity design, we conduct a graphical evaluation. In Fig. 1 we first display the
mean financial leverage for firms with between 1,500 to 2,500 domestic employees
using bins of 50 employees.18 As PER is mandated by law for firms with more
than 2,000 domestic employees, we expect a discontinuity at this threshold. Indeed,
we find an increase in leverage if the number of domestic employees exceeds this
threshold. This is true whether we use a quadratic (a) or a linear fitting (b) and we
also observe a similar pattern when using bins of 100 instead of 50 employees in (c)
and (d). Thus, these graphical evaluations provide a first indication that PER leads
to higher financial leverage ratios.
— Fig. 1 about here —
The main regression discontinuity analysis is presented in Table 2. As explained
in Section 2.3, we exploit that PER is required by law in firms with more than 2,000
domestic employees for identification. For the analysis, we use the RDD sample
which covers firms with between 1,500 and 2,500 domestic employees. We indicate
in each column of the table how we control for the number of domestic employees.
We start with controlling for the centered number of domestic employees in Model I.
In the next model, we include the centered number of domestic employees and the
squared centered number as controls. Model III includes polynomials up to order
two on both sides of the threshold. In the next model, we additionally control for
18For this figure, we exclude firm-years with more than 2,000 DE but no parity employee repre-
sentation and those with up to 2,000 DE but parity employee representation. See the discussion on
time lags in Section 2.3.1 for more details.
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several firm-specific factors like size or profitability. In the last model, we include
polynomials up to order four on both sides of the threshold and additionally add
interactions of the control variables with a dummy for more than 2,000 domestic
employees. This allows for different effects of the controls on both sides of the
threshold. In all models, we find strong and consistent evidence that PER increases
financial leverage. The magnitude of this effect is slightly above 10 percentage points.
Thus, the positive impact of PER on financial leverage is not only statistically
significant, but also economically relevant. Overall, this finding is in line with the
bargaining and interest alignment perspective.
An important aspect of any RD estimation is to check whether the covariates are
balanced around the threshold. For this purpose, we use the controls as dependent
variables in Panel B of Table 2. The insignificant results for PER indicate that
there is no statistical evidence for a discontinuity of any control variable around the
threshold. Thus, we conclude that discontinuous control variables are unlikely to
bias our findings for PER.
— Table 2 about here —
4.2. RDD: identification assumption
An important identification assumption is that firms near the threshold are not
precisely manipulating the number of domestic employees. One concern with this
assumption in our setting may be that managers could have incentives to strategi-
cally stay below the threshold of 2,000 domestic employees to avoid PER. Although
we cannot rule out that such manipulation would be theoretically possible, we follow
Atanasov and Black (2016) and investigate whether there is any evidence that the
threshold is indeed manipulated in practice.
An argument against actual manipulation in order to avoid PER is that this
would imply that both the firm’s owners and managers are willing to forgo future
growth. We argue that this is not very plausible. Rather, owners and managers
are well aware that they cannot avoid codetermination if they want the firm to
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grow. Thus, there is no reason to strategically reduce firm growth just to postpone
PER because the real option value of delaying growth is very small in this setting.
Furthermore, large-scale strategic manipulation of firms to avoid PER is unlikely as
the law is in place without major changes of its main elements since 1976. If there
would be evidence for such behavior, it is very likely that the legislator would have
adjusted the law.19
The empirical literature on labor regulation and firm size find that more stringent
regulations can slow down firm growth. For example, Blanchard and Wolfers (2000),
Botero et al. (2004), and Almeida and Carneiro (2009), among others, present evi-
dence consistent with stronger labor rights causing firms to stay small, in order to
avoid labor regulations that take effect if they grow to a certain size and/or to avoid
taking on workers they cannot later fire. This evidence suggests that some manipu-
lation in response to regulation may exist. With regard to size-based regulations and
firm headcount growth, there is also some evidence for strategic behavior of firms
(e.g., Schivardi and Torrini, 2008; Garicano, LeLarge and Van Reenen, 2013). How-
ever, most studies in this context analyze regulations that affect small firms (e.g.,
15 or 50 employees). In our analysis, we focus on medium-sized and large firms for
which manipulation of the threshold is likely more difficult because the incentives
of owners and managers may not be aligned in these firms. Indeed, Kim, Maug and
Schneider (2015) report that they detect no discontinuity around the threshold of
2,000 domestic employees in Germany.
We also perform a graphical evaluation to investigate whether there is a disconti-
nuity in the distribution of domestic employees around 2,000 for our sample. If firms
stay below the threshold to avoid PER, we would expect to see a disproportionally
high number of firms just below the threshold and a low number above. We use a
McCrary (2008) density test around the threshold to investigative the distribution
19In 2005, a Government Commission (the so-called “Biedenkopf” Commission) was set up to
review the law on codetermination. Their final report summarizes that “academic members stated
that they saw no reason to propose a fundamental revision of the German system of board-level
representation”, “the protection for employee interests provided by the existing regulations remains
appropriate”, and “only very few cases of companies avoiding board-level representation are known”.
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of domestic employees around the threshold (see Fig. 2). We find no evidence for
any significant discontinuity around 2,000 domestic employees. Thus, this graphical
evaluation does not provide any indication for large-scale strategic manipulation of
firms to avoid PER.
— Fig. 2 about here —
However, it may still be that some firm manipulate the threshold upwards,
whereas others engage in downwards manipulation, which can create a smooth dis-
tribution around the threshold (Roberts and Whited, 2013). Thus, we addition-
ally analyze firms in high-growth industries because firms in such environments are
less likely able to precisely manipulate their number of employees, which creates
“variation in treatment near the threshold [which] is randomized as though from a
randomized experiment” (Lee and Lemieux, 2010, p. 283). High-growth industries
are defined as those in which the growth over the past one or two years was higher
than the median growth across all industries in the sample. As growth proxies, we
analyze changes in sales, the total number of employees, and the number of domes-
tic employees. The industry definition follows our main 38 industries specification.
Results are reported in Panel A of Table 3. We find a strong and positive impact
of PER on financial leverage in all different specifications. Thus, our finding is also
valid for high-growth industries, in which the precise manipulation of firm size is
less likely.
— Table 3 about here —
4.3. RDD: bandwidth and estimation approach
The choice of the RDD bandwidth is a trade-off between sample size and compa-
rability of observations on both sides of the threshold. To alleviate concerns that our
bandwidth choice biases the findings, we first follow suggestions in Angrist and Pis-
chke (2008) and Atanasov and Black (2016) and investigate how the effect changes
if we narrow the bandwidth. Both argue that the coefficient estimate should remain
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reasonably stable when reducing the bandwidth in a valid RDD setting. Results for
narrower windows are shown in Panel B of Table 3. These alternative windows are
± 400, ± 300, ± 200, and ± 100 DE. Although the number of observations drops
considerably, the coefficient for PER is positive and statistically highly significant
for all alternative windows. Furthermore, it has a similar magnitude as in our main
model. Thus, the positive effect of PER on financial leverage is not weaker if only
firms near the cut-off point are considered, providing evidence for the validity of our
RDD setting.
An alternative estimation approach is a non-parametric, local RD strategy (cf.
Lee and Lemieux, 2010). One advantage of this method is that the optimal band-
width can be automatically estimated, reducing concerns that arbitrarily chosen
values bias the results. Furthermore, mainly observations close to the cutoff point
are considered in this approach. Although this reduces our sample size considerably
because the number of observations (very) close to the threshold of 2,000 is limited,
we present this estimation approach as a robustness check. In particular, we apply
local polynomial RD estimation with robust standard errors to analyze differences in
leverage between observations slightly below and above the threshold (cf. Calonico,
Cattaneo and Titiunik, 2014; Calonico et al., 2016). The bandwidth selection pro-
cedure is based on the mean square error optimal bandwidth selector. The results
show that the outcome of the local strategy is very similar to our previously used
approach.
4.4. RDD: firm size
Another concern may be that our results capture a general size effect. Although
firms on the right-hand size of the threshold tend to be larger, it should be noted
that we already control for the number of domestic employees in all models (up to
polynomial four) to capture the discontinuous effect at the threshold.
To further mitigate such concerns, we start by performing placebo tests. If the
prior results were not related to PER, but to a general effect due to an increase
in the number of domestic employees, we would expect to find similar outcomes
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around other thresholds which have nothing to do with PER. We use 1,000, 1,500,
2,500 and 3,000 domestic employees as alternative thresholds for the placebo test
in Panel C and restrict the sample to firm-years with threshold ± 500 domestic
employees. We find no indication that leverage changes significantly around these
arbitrary thresholds. We also perform a placebo test with a threshold of 2,000 total
employees. As explained before, the German law on codetermination focuses only
on the number of domestic, not total employees. Consequently, we find no evidence
that leverage changes around this threshold. Overall, these placebo tests provide
further evidence that our prior result is indeed related to PER which is triggered by
the threshold of 2,000 domestic employees.
Next, we perform a size matching approach in Panel D of Table 3. For this,
we exploit that the assignment variable, i.e., the number of domestic employees
is not perfectly correlated with traditional proxies for firm size like total assets.
Furthermore, we do not expect any direct impact of the number of domestic em-
ployees on leverage, as this is not a commonly used control variable (Frank and
Goyal, 2009). Empirically, we match treated (PER) and control firms (without
PER) by total assets and calculate the average treatment effect (ATE). We apply
propensity-score matching, nearest-neighbor matching, inverse-probability-weighted
regression adjustment, and augmented inverse-probability weighted regression ad-
justment. The latter two approaches allow us to control for firm-level factors in the
leverage regression. All models point at a positive effect of PER on leverage and
the magnitude of the effect is comparable as in our main specifications. Thus, we
conclude that differences in firm size between PER and non-PER firms are unlikely
to bias our findings.
4.5. RDD: general robustness tests
As further robustness tests, we apply industry-year fixed effects instead of in-
dustry and year fixed effects (PER coefficient of 0.17, t-value of 3.21), restrict the
sample to public firms (0.17, t-value of 2.38), and exclude the years 2008 and 2009
to avoid any bias due to the financial crisis (0.16, t-value of 3.83). We also find
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no evidence that the impact of PER is significantly different before and after the
crisis. Lastly, to account for the fact that many firms in Germany are dominated
by founding families (e.g., Ellul, Pagano and Panunzi, 2010), we control for family
ownership (0.12, t-value of 2.53).
4.6. Difference-in-differences analysis
As an alternative identification strategy, we analyze the introduction of the law
on codetermination in 1976 in a difference-in-differences setting. For this, we com-
pare firms which were affected by the law’s introduction, i.e., those with more than
2,000 domestic employees, with those which were not affected. An advantage here
is that manipulation is less likely in this setting. Although we carefully examine the
validity of our RDD setting, it is difficult to completely rule out this possibility in
that context. Although still possible to some extent, manipulation of the PER sta-
tus by either increasing or decreasing the number of domestic employees is a lesser
concern for the DiD setting, mainly because the threshold of 2,000 was not largely
expected and adjusting the number of employees takes time (see the discussion on
anticipation effects in the next section for more details).
The details of the empirical methodology are described in Section 2.3. Re-
sults are presented in Table 4, Panel A. We start with windows of plus/minus two
years around the introduction period in Model I, and move to four-year windows in
Model III. All models include firm and time-fixed effects. Although the firm-fixed
effects already control for time-constant firm-specific factors, we also add firm size
and then additionally profitability as control variables.20 Across all specifications,
we find consistent evidence that treated firms increased their financial leverage after
the introduction of the law on codetermination. The economic magnitude of this
effect is around five percentage points. Thus, this finding is in line with our RDD
results.
— Table 4 about here —
20Due to data availability limitations, we cannot include more detailed control variables.
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A possible concern for the DiD analysis is the quality of German accounting data
in the 1970s. Harris, Lang and Moller (1994) compare U.S. and German accounting
data and find no significant differences regarding the information content of reported
earnings. However, there is evidence that shareholder equity may be less informative
in Germany. These possible flaws of the German accounting system may affect our
findings because we rely on the book value of equity for our main leverage definition.
Furthermore, the reported assets of firms may be biased. To mitigate these concerns,
we first use market capitalization instead of total assets as proxy for firm size in
Model IIId. Second, we replace our main leverage definition with market leverage,
which is defined as total debt divided by the sum of total debt plus market value
of equity in Model IV. Both alternative specifications lead to very similar results
as our main models. Thus, flaws in the accounting figures are unlikely to bias our
results.
To alleviate concerns that size differences between the treated and control groups
bias our findings, we use an equal number of size-matched control firms in our main
specifications. The matching is always based on firms’ total assets in the pre-event
year, i.e., 1975. We additionally present the outcome from alternative size-matching
procedures in Panel B. In Model Va, we use all non-treated firms, irrespective of
their size, as the control group. Treated and control firms are then matched based
on propensity scores in Models Vb and Vc. In the latter specification, we use a
restrictive caliper of 0.06, which equals approximately 20% of the standard deviation
of the propensity score to further improve the balancing. We find similar results as
before across all alternative specifications. Not surprisingly, we find strong size
differences between treated and control firms when using all non-treated firms as
controls in Model Va. These differences are much smaller when using the matching
approaches and very close to zero in the last model (with no statistical evidence for
any size difference).
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4.7. DiD: anticipation and parallel trends
Next, we test two important aspects in the context of DiD analyses: anticipation
effects and trends before the event. We start with anticipation effects. Before 1974,
there has only been a very vague suspicion that a law which may increase employee
power could be introduced in the future, but it was neither clear how the details of
such a law would look like nor whether such a law would come at all. In particular,
the two ruling parties SPD and FDP were in disagreement regarding an increase
in employee power. Thus, the first announcement that the government plans to
introduce a new law on codetermination in early 1974 came as a surprise. This was
also the first time that details like criteria of firms which would have to implement
parity codetermination were officially announced. Later that year, a preliminary
draft of the law was presented. In this setting, we consider it as unlikely that firms
had enough time to perfectly manipulate their number of domestic employees in
anticipation of the new law. Especially downward manipulation would have been
difficult given the strict employee protection laws in Germany. A more feasible
way to avoid codetermination may have been to relocate the company headquarters
to another country, but this did not happen in large scale (Raiser, Veil and Jacobs,
2015, p. 35). Upward manipulation may also be possible, but this would require that
owners and managers agree to have a suboptimal high staff number and thus lower
profitability. Thus, we consider large-scale manipulation of the threshold unlikely in
this setting, but we cannot completely rule out that some firms engaged in manipu-
lation. To reduce concerns about anticipation effects before the law’s introduction,
we alternatively only use years before 1974 as pre-event period. Again, the results
in Model VIa are very similar and even stronger than in our main specifications.
Another important identification assumption for difference-in-differences analysis
is that there is no different development of the dependent variable in treated and
control firms before the event (“parallel trends assumption”). To see whether this
assumption is fulfilled, we investigate the time dynamics around the law change in
Model VIb. We find no evidence for any difference in the development of financial
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leverage between both groups before the event. There is a strong difference between
treated and control firms, but only after the law was introduced.
5. Interest alignment
Our main results are consistent with both the bargaining and the interest align-
ment perspective. To differentiate between these two, we first investigate how bank
ownership affects the impact of PER on leverage. After that, we analyze the impact
of PER on firms’ interest rates and loan characteristics.
5.1. Bank ownership
If our results can be explained by an interest alignment effect, we expect that
PER should be of minor importance if banks have other channels to directly influence
firm policy. One such channel, which is not uncommon in the German environment,
is bank ownership (Gorton and Schmid, 2000). Equity stakes enable banks to affect
firm policy more effectively than being just debt providers, e.g., via a seat as firm
owner in the supervisory board. Consequently, we hypothesize that the effect of
PER is attenuated if a bank holds equity of the firm.
Our main empirical strategy to test this hypothesis is threefold: we start with
analyzing the effect of bank ownership using the regression discontinuity design. Af-
ter that, we focus on the interaction of PER with bank ownership based on firm-fixed
effects. Lastly, we circumvent the possible issue of endogenously determined bank
ownership by using an exogenous event that reduced bank ownership in Germany:
the capital gains tax reform in 2000. Data on bank ownership comes from annual
versions of the Hoppenstedt books before 1997 and from CD-ROMs as well as di-
rect data delivery from Hoppenstedt thereafter. Based on that data, we construct a
dummy variable which indicates whether a bank owns voting right of the firm. For
the test exploiting the tax event we focus on ownership by German banks as only
these have been affected by the event.
Results for the RDD sample are presented in Table 5, Model Ia. We find that the
positive impact of PER on leverage only exists for firms without bank ownership.
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If banks have other channels to influence firm policy, e.g., via direct ownership,
employee codetermination seems to play no role. As next step, we focus on firms
which changed their PER status between 1984 and 1998. This period is chosen
because it does neither overlap with the analyses of the law’s introduction nor the
tax reform which will be exploited as third strategy. The results in Model IIa confirm
the previous finding: if firms implement (abandon) PER, leverage goes up (down).
This effect, however, is much less pronounced for firms with bank ownership. Here
endogeneity concerns with regard to bank ownership are less severe as the main
identification comes from legally mandated changes in PER over time.
— Table 5 about here —
To further mitigate concerns that endogenously determined bank ownership bi-
ases our findings in this context, we exploit a tax reform in 2000. This reform
abolished capital gain taxes if corporates sold their equity stakes. Due to historical
reasons, German banks often held large equity stakes in other German corporations;
the origin of these holdings often dated back to the time after World War II (Ed-
wards et al., 2004). Increases in the value of these equity stakes over time made it
unattractive for banks to sell them before the tax reform. The reduction of equity
holdings of banks companies, which were commonly regarded as a centerpiece of
cross-links between German firms (also called “Deutschland AG”) was one of the
aims of the tax reform. As capital gains taxes could be close to 50% of the value
of the equity holding before the reform, this represented a fundamental change and
led to a wave of equity divestitures (Weber, 2009). The decline of bank ownership
of public German firms is illustrated in Fig. 3.
— Fig. 3 about here —
The plans for a tax reform were first mentioned in late 1999.21 The abolishment
21The announcement of plans to reduce capital gains taxes led to a massive increase in stock
prices of financial service companies. For instance, Edwards et al. (2004) report that stock prices
climbed 18% for Munich Re, 13.6% for Deutsche Bank, and 12.9% for Allianz.
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of the capital gains tax took place on January 1, 2002. Thus, the event period
is 1999 to 2001. We use four-year pre- and post-event windows (i.e., from 1995
to 1998 and 2002 to 2005). We focus on firms listed in the CDAX, the broadest
German stock index, for this test because these are the firms for which domestic
bank ownership is most likely. We are able to identify 62 companies with domestic
bank ownership in the pre-event period, which form the sample for this test. For
these firms, we obtain data on financial statements from Worldscope and identify
their codetermination status based on Hoppenstedt’s supervisory board data and
firms’ annual reports. We expect that firms with PER before the tax reform (i.e.,
in 1998) are less affected by the event because their codetermination status serves
as substitute for bank ownership. Thus, PER firms are the treated group and non-
PER firms the control group. We estimate a difference-in-differences model with
firm-fixed effects around the tax reform.22
Results are presented in Model III of Table 5. We find that firms with bank
ownership significantly reduced their leverage after the tax reform (Model IIIa). This
effect, however, only exists for non-PER firms. Companies with codetermination
exhibit no significant reduction in leverage after the event.23 The exogenous nature
of the tax event makes it unlikely that endogeneity biases these findings. Overall,
we find that interest alignment due to PER is of reduced importance when banks
have a direct voice in the firm through their equity stakes. This provides evidence
for a substitution effect between bank ownership and PER with regard to interest
alignment.
An important aspect regarding banks and bank ownership in Germany is the
proxy voting system (“Depotstimmrecht”). This system allows banks, with some
restrictions, to exercise the votes of shares held for customers who do not want to
exercise this right themselves (see, for instance, Baums, 1994). These are usually
small private (“atomistic”) shareholders. As a result, German banks often have
22We do not consider firms without domestic bank ownership as the event is unlikely to have any
effect for these.
23Unreported results confirm that this finding also holds if year-fixed effects are included.
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more actual voting rights than their share ownership. We hypothesize that the
substitution effect between bank ownership and employee codetermination should
be different for firms with high and low levels of free float. Essentially, we use the
level of free float to proxy for the likelihood and extent of proxy voting by banks.24
In firms with high levels of free float, banks are likely to have high voting rights
independent of their actual share ownership due to the proxy voting system. Thus,
direct bank ownership should be of minor importance for financial leverage, and in
turn the substitution effect between PER and direct ownership by banks should be
weak. In contrast, this substitution effect should mainly exist in firms with low free
float, in which proxy voting plays no or a very minor role and banks need to rely on
their direct voting rights.
As a validation test, we empirically test these predictions. For this, we define
private firms and public firms with less than the median free float as low free float
firms. Public firms with more than the median free float are high free float firms.
We then estimate the previous models separately for these sub-samples. Results are
reported in Table 5, Models (b) and (c). For all three test settings (RDD, firm-fixed
effects, and the tax event), we find that the substitution effect between PER and
bank ownership only exists for firms with low levels of free float. The coefficients
on the interactions for the high free float samples are small and far from significant.
Overall, this new test helps to validate our prior findings for bank ownership.
5.2. Interest rate
If there is an interest alignment between banks and firms with higher employee
power, we further expect more favorable financing conditions for those firms. Thus
we analyze firms’ cost of debt and expect lower loan spreads for codetermined firms.
As an empirical proxy for the cost of debt we use data on syndicated loans from
24The idea behind this measure is that “the votes of dispersed shareholders are concentrated in
banks” (Gorton and Schmid, 2000, p. 48). For instance, Baums and Fraune (1995) find that banks
had a majority during the shareholders’ meeting in 20 of the 24 largest German companies with
predominately widely held stocks, mainly because of proxy voting.
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Dealscan.25 Due to the limited number of firms using syndicated loans and because
loan spreads are not always reported in Dealscan, the number of firms which we
can use for this test is rather low. Thus, we do not impose any restrictions on the
number of domestic employees for this test. This results in about 253 loans from
61 different firms. In addition to the control variables in the leverage models, we
include controls for leverage and default risk. The latter is approximated by the
Z-score. All firm-specific independent variables are lagged one year (i.e., they refer
to the last available annual report before the loan). Furthermore, we also control
for loan purpose and amount. Results are presented in Table 6. We first estimate a
model without industry and year fixed effects. In the subsequent models, we include
year-fixed and industry-fixed effects. All models provide consistent evidence that
PER reduces cost of debt.26 The magnitude of cost of debt reduction is around
1.5 percent points in spread. Thus, the impact of PER on cost of debt is not only
statistically significant, but also economically relevant.
— Table 6 about here —
5.3. Loan characteristics
Besides the spread, we also investigate other loan-level information from Dealscan.
We focus on debt maturity and covenants. Based on the interest alignment hypothe-
sis, we expect that PER increases debt maturity (Guedes and Opler, 1996). Results
shown in Table 7 support this view. For covenants, we find that the number of
covenants is on average lower for firms with parity employee representation. This
is in line with our expectations as there are less incentive conflicts between code-
termined firms and creditors. Overall, all these findings indicate that firms with
PER have more favorable financing conditions and provide support for the view
25For this, we manually match the sample firms to Dealscan by firm name. For cost of debt we
focus on the all-in-drawn spread (spread).
26Morck, Nakamura and Shivdasani (2000) find Japanese firms more likely to be controlled by
banks using more debt but paying higher interest costs and argue that main banks in Japan can, to
a certain extent, strong-arm borrower firms into borrowing more and paying higher interest rates
(Rajan, 1992). The lower interest rates documented in our setting likely suggest a more passive
role for banks in Germany compared to those in Japan.
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that higher employee power increases interest alignment between borrowing firms
and banks.
— Table 7 about here —
6. Channels
In this section we investigate firm risk as a possible channel for the interest
alignment between banks and firms with PER. Risk-averse employees may have
strong incentives to reduce firm risk due to their firm-specific human capital (Gorton
and Schmid, 2000). If stronger employee power reduces firm risk, this would provide
an intuitive explanation for lower agency conflicts between these firms and banks.
6.1. Investments
In general, mergers and acquisitions can increase or decrease firm-value. Debt
providers, however, may dislike M&A deals as they often increase firm complexity
and managers’ and owners’ possibilities for self-utility maximizing behavior (e.g.,
empire building). Furthermore, M&A deals can increase firm risk and reduce sta-
bility as the long-term success of such transactions is often highly uncertain. We
collect data on M&A deals for each sample year from SDC Platinum and match this
information to our sample firms (based on firm names).27 Results are presented in
Table 8. We include the same control variables as for leverage plus leverage itself.
All independent variables are lagged one year (i.e., they are based on the last avail-
able annual report before the deal). We start by examining a dummy variable which
indicates whether a firm conducted any M&A deal in a specific year. After that, we
investigate the annual number of deals a firm conducts. For both models, we find
strong evidence that PER leads to significantly less M&A activity. Thus, firms with
stronger employee power tend to conduct fewer M&A deals.
27In particular, we match the deals to the sample years based on their announcement dates and
consider all announced deals.
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The next question we focus on is whether these firms select their M&A targets
more carefully. If employee representatives are effective monitors who reduce man-
agerial agency cost, they may force managers to focus on value-increasing deals and
avoid those related to their utility maximization. For this purpose, we analyze capi-
tal market reactions to the announcements of M&A deals. In terms of methodology,
we calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around the announcement dates.
As event windows, we apply three days and use five days as robustness tests. Nor-
mal returns are estimated during the 200 trading days ending two months before
the event. We use the CDAX as the market index. In addition, we also examine
cumulative excess returns (CER), i.e., the returns of the firm which announces the
deal above the market return. Results are reported in Table 8. We include two
dummy variables which indicate whether the deal is diversifying or international.
In Models IIa-IIc, we use the bandwidth of 1,500 to 2,500 DE, and in Models IIIa
to IIIc, we run estimations using the larger bandwidth of 1,000 to 3,000 DE with
industry fixed effects. Across all specifications, we find that the stock market reacts
more positively to M&A announcements of firms with PER. This is in line with the
view that these firms tend to conduct value-increasing deals and avoid transactions
that are related to utility maximization of managers.
— Table 8 about here —
6.2. Cash flow stability
We next investigate the stability of firms’ cash flows and profits. If employee
power leads to more stable business decisions, we expect less cash flow and profit
fluctuation in firms with PER. We measure the standard deviation of cash flows
and profits over firms’ past three fiscal years. For the explanatory variables, we use
the values as of the beginning of the respective window to focus on forward-looking
stability and also control for sales growth. Results in Table 9, Model I provide
evidence for more stability of cash flows and profits in firms with stronger employee
power. Thus, these findings indicate that lower firm risk is a possible channel for
the interest alignment between firms with codetermination and banks.
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— Table 9 about here —
6.3. Idiosyncratic risk
Besides the volatility of cash flows and profits, we also examine idiosyncratic firm
risk. If firms with PER implement more stable investment and financial policies, we
expect that these firms also have less idiosyncratic risk. To calculate idiosyncratic
risk, we follow Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012). In particular, we calculate σidio. for
each firm year based on weekly residuals of equity returns. The residuals are obtained
from regressing the firm’s equity returns on the CDAX as market return. σidio for
firm i in year t is then calculated as σi,tidio =
√
52∑
τ=1
2i,τ , where i,τ is the residual from
the first regression in week τ . More details can be found in Appendix A. Results
in Model II of Table 9 show that parity codetermination reduces idiosyncratic risk.
This further adds evidence that lower firm risk is a channel for the interest alignment
effect between firms with PER and banks.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze how a direct voice of employees in firms’ governance
structure affects financial leverage. For this, we focus on a setting in which employ-
ees have a strong and direct influence on firms’ policy: employee representatives in
the supervisory boards of German firms. The supervisory board is comparable to
the board of directors and has, among others, the duty to monitor the executive
managers. This setting has two desirable features. First, the influence of employees
is substantial: by law, the supervisory board of German firms has to consist of an
equal number of employee and owner representatives (parity employee representa-
tion, PER). Second, the law’s design provides an identification strategy because it
only applies to firms with more than 2,000 domestic employees. Using a regression
discontinuity design around this threshold and a difference-in-differences analysis
around the introduction of the law in 1976 for identification we find strong evidence
that PER increases leverage. Combining these two different methods which both are
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not completely free of concerns enables us to better understand the causal impact
of employee codetermination on financial leverage.
Our setting differs from the existing literature on employee power and financial
leverage along two dimensions. First, we analyze how a direct voice of employees
in the firms’ governance structure affects financial leverage. Prior literature in this
area focuses on indirect influence of labor, e.g., via labor unions or employee protec-
tion. Second, power is shifted from owners to employees by law. We analyze three
perspectives on how employee power can affect leverage in this setting: bargaining,
employment protection, and interest alignment.
We find strong support for the interest alignment perspective. Employee repre-
sentatives who aim to protect the interests of the firm’s employees may (unintention-
ally) also help to protect the interests of banks as both stakeholders are interested in
the long-term survival and stability of the firm. In line with this explanation, we find
that bank ownership and PER act as substitutes. As bank ownership may be en-
dogenous, we also exploit the capital gains tax reform of 2000 as an exogenous shock
to banks’ equity holdings. Further analyses also reveal that firms with PER enjoy
more favorable financing conditions, i.e., lower cost of debt, longer debt maturities,
and fewer covenants. Lastly, we identify lower firm risk due to codetermination as
possible channel for this interest alignment effect. In particular, firms with strong
employee power conduct fewer and better M&A deals, have more stable cash flows
and profits, and have lower idiosyncratic risk.
Behind the background of a steady shift from indirect employee representation
via labor unions to more direct forms of employee influence (Wilkinson et al., 2014),
our results have important implications. Most importantly, we show that the conse-
quences of direct employee influence can be very different from those of an indirect
influence. Thus, the results for indirect employee influence, which has been the
main focus of the literature on labor and finance, may not necessarily be applica-
ble to more direct forms of labor voice. In particular, our findings indicate that a
direct voice of employees in firms’ governance structure can be a powerful mecha-
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nism to reduce agency conflicts between debt providers and firms and to improve
their financing opportunities and conditions. Revealing the mechanism of how direct
employee influence affects corporate decision making may support policy makers to
advance and improve regulations on how employees can express their voice in firms’
governance structure.
Our findings raise the question whether firms can also profit by voluntarily grant-
ing employees such a direct voice or whether this requires a stringent legal frame-
work. Although this cannot be definitively answered by this paper, we speculate
that a positive effect on financing requires at least a strong commitment of the firm
to such rights. Otherwise, the possibility that firms divest employees of their rights
in certain situations, e.g., changes in the ownership structure, may wipe out the
positive effects of direct employee voice for financing. A more detailed investigation
on the situations in which direct employee influence improves financing conditions
is a promising area for future research. More generally, further investigations of the
impact of employee representation on optimal board composition (e.g., Weisbach,
1988) or the role of the board (e.g., Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989) may also help
to further our understanding of the consequences of a direct employee voice.
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Fig. 1. This figure shows regression discontinuity plots with quadratic (a, c) or linear (b, d) fits and
the corresponding 90% confidence intervals. The x-axis displays the number of domestic employees,
measured in bins of 50 or 100 employees around 2,000. Positive (negative) values indicate firms
with (without) PER. The y-axis shows the mean leverage in the respective bin.
(a) bins of 50, quadratic fit (b) bins of 50, linear fit
(c) bins of 100, quadratic fit (d) bins of 100, linear fit
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Fig. 2. This figure shows the McCrary (2008) density test for domestic employees around the
threshold of 2,000 domestic employees. The density function is estimated for the full sample. The
graph is based on the “DCdensity” function in Stata and default values are used for the bandwidth
and bin size.
Fig. 3. This figure shows bank ownership before and after the tax reform. The vertical axis
represents the average ownership of German banks in firms listed in the CDAX.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics
This table presents the number of observations (N), mean,
standard deviation (SD), 25% percentile, median, and 75% per-
centile values for the main variables used in the paper. Panel A
displays the descriptive statistics for the regression discontinuity
sample. Here, only firm-years with ≥ 1,500 and ≤ 2,500 domestic
employees are considered. Panel B focuses on the law introduc-
tion sample, which covers the years 1972 to 1983. A detailed
description of all variables can be found in Appendix A.
Variable N Mean SD p25 p50 p75
Panel A: RDD sample (2005 to 2013)
PER 385 0.26 0.44 0 0 1
DE 385 1882 276 1644 1842 2063
Leverage 385 0.52 0.20 0.39 0.56 0.64
Size (mio Eur) 385 620 612 263 440 704
ROA 385 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.12
Tangibility 385 0.33 0.19 0.20 0.30 0.41
TobQind 385 1.31 0.34 1.11 1.22 1.45
Listing 382 0.38 0.49 0 0 1
Acc. Std. 385 0.47 0.50 0 0 1
Panel B: Law introduction sample (1972 to 1983)
Treated 1380 0.45 0.50 0 0 1
Leverage 1380 0.65 0.17 0.58 0.67 0.76
Size (mio Eur) 1378 760 1929 62 152 573
ROA 1361 0.09 2.19 0.01 0.02 0.04
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Table 2
Regression discontinuity analysis
In Panel A, the dependent variable is leverage. per stands for parity employee
representation and equals one for firms with parity codetermination. All models are
pooled OLS regressions. Independent variables except accounting standard and
listing are lagged one period. Firm-years with between 1,500 and 2,500 domestic
employees are included. Polynomial indicates how we control for the centered num-
ber of domestic employees. Either side means that polynomials interacted with a
dummy for > 2,000 DE are included. Controls x > DE2,000 indicates whether firm
control variables interacted with a dummy for > 2,000 DE are included. In Panel B,
the controls are used as dependent variables to examine whether they are balanced
around the threshold. The model specifications follow Panel A, Model V. T-statistics
based on Huber/White robust standard errors clustered by firms are presented in
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance on the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-levels,
respectively. A detailed description of all variables can be found in Appendix A.
Panel A: Leverage around threshold
Model I II III IV V
PER 0.11** 0.11** 0.11** 0.14*** 0.14***
(2.59) (2.60) (2.52) (3.77) (3.31)
Size -0.0044 -0.011
(-0.12) (-0.24)
ROA -0.80*** -0.85***
(-3.64) (-3.97)
Tangibility -0.23 -0.17
(-1.38) (-0.81)
TobQind 0.029 0.022
(0.66) (0.39)
Listing 0.050 0.058
(0.78) (0.67)
Acc. Std. -0.14** -0.18***
(-2.51) (-2.65)
Observations 357 357 357 345 345
Firms 100 100 100 97 97
Adj. R2 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.37 0.42
Industry/Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Polynomial one two two two four
/ either side no no yes yes yes
Controls x > DE2,000 no no no no yes
Panel B: Covariates around threshold
Dep. variable Size ROA Tangibility Listing Acc. Std.
PER 0.35 -0.019 0.0013 0.15 0.14
(1.56) (-0.84) (0.029) (1.21) (1.04)
Observations 351 351 351 348 351
Industry/Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
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Table 3
Regression discontinuity: alternative specifications and matching
The dependent variable is leverage. per stands for parity employee representation and equals
one for firms with parity codetermination. Firm-years with between 1,500 and 2,500 domestic
employees are included, if not stated otherwise. The non-reported controls follow Table 2. We
control for the centered number of domestic employees up to polynomial two on both sides of the
threshold. In Panel A, only high-growth industries are considered. High-growth industries are those
industries in which the growth over the past one or two years was higher than the median growth
across all industries in the sample. Growth is either measured as sales, total staff, or domestic
employees growth. The industry definition follows the Fama/French 38 industries classification. In
Panel B, we present alternative RDD specifications with narrower windows of domestic employees
around the threshold of 2,000 DE. We also apply a local polynomial RD estimator with robust
bias-corrected standard errors and a MSE-optimal bandwidth selector. For these models, we use
contemporaneous instead of lagged independent variables. Panel C presents placebo tests with
arbitrary thresholds around domestic (DE) or total employees (TE). These models include firm-
years with ± 500 domestic employees. In Panel D, we present size matching based on propensity-
score matching (PSC), nearest-neighbor (NN) with (n) neighbors, or inverse-probability-weighted
regression adjustment (IPWRA) and augmented inverse-probability weighted regression adjustment
(AIPW) models with control variables. ATE stands for the average treatment effect. Firm size as
measured by total assets is the matching variable. ***, ** and * indicate significance on the 1%-,
5%- and 10%-levels, respectively. A detailed description of all variables can be found in Appendix A.
Panel A: High growth industries
sales growth staff growth DE growth
one year two years one year two years one year two years
PER 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.13** 0.16** 0.17** 0.14**
(3.67) (3.54) (2.17) (2.50) (2.06) (2.24)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 174 170 171 164 172 165
Panel B: Bandwidth
alternative bandwidth optimal bandwidth
± 400 DE ± 300 DE ± 200 DE ± 100 DE local polynomial RD
PER 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.11* 0.15*** 0.18* 0.18***
(2.99) (2.81) (1.90) (2.87) (1.70) (3.30)
Controls yes yes yes yes no yes
Observations 288 208 134 62 78 82
Panel C: Placebo tests
1,000 DE 1,500 DE 2,500 DE 3,000 DE 2,000 TE
DummyDE/TE -0.030 -0.029 -0.020 -0.033 -0.048
(-0.70) (-0.73) (-0.40) (-0.86) (-1.08)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 540 495 221 173 288
continued on next page
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Table 3 continued
Panel D: Size matching
PSC NN(1) NN(2) NN(3) IPWRA AIPW
ATE (PER) 0.092** 0.094** 0.095** 0.091** 0.11*** 0.075***
(2.18) (2.32) (2.45) (2.19) (3.79) (3.35)
Controls no no no no yes yes
Observations 352 352 352 352 340 340
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Table 4
Difference-in-differences analysis
The dependent variable is leverage, if not stated otherwise. All models are firm-fixed effects
regressions. Panel A investigates the introduction of the law on codetermination. The German
parliament passed the law on May 4, 1976 and it became effective on July 1 with a two-year transition
period. The introduction period ends with the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court
to reject a constitutional complaint and its ruling that the the law was valid on March 1, 1979.
Firms which introduced PER during this introduction period are treated. postintr equals one
after 1979. The pre- and post-event periods around the introduction period are indicated in each
column. Control firms are dropped based on their total assets (in 1975) until the numbers of control
and treated firms are equal. treated and postintr are absorbed by firm and year-fixed effects.
Panel B presents alternative specifications for the [-4,+4] period. In Model IV, the dependent
variable is market leverage, which is defined as total debt divided by the sum of total debt plus
market value of equity. We use all control firms in Model Va or conduct propensity score nearest
neighbor matching without replacement based on total assets (in 1975) in Model Vb; in Model Vc,
we apply a more restrictive caliper of 0.06 (about 20% of the SD of the propensity score). The
years 1974 and 1975 are not considered as pre-event period in Model VIa. Model VIb shows the
dynamics around the introduction period with -2y denoting the year 1974, -1y the year 1975, 1y
the year 1980, and 2y+ years after 1980, respectively. T-statistics based on Huber/White robust
standard errors clustered by firms are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance
on the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-levels, respectively. A detailed description of all variables can be found
in Appendix A.
Panel A: Introduction of the law on codetermination
Model I II IIIa IIIb IIIc IIId
Window [years] [-2,+2] [-3,+3] [-4,+4] [-4,+4] [-4,+4] [-4,+4]
Treated x Post 0.042** 0.045** 0.052*** 0.039** 0.039** 0.044**
(2.21) (2.34) (2.62) (2.26) (2.29) (2.23)
Size (total assets [ln]) 0.058*** 0.059***
(5.27) (5.31)
Size (market cap [ln]) 0.0060
(0.43)
ROA -0.013 -0.20**
(-0.13) (-2.03)
Observations 692 1,037 1,380 1,191 1,174 1,160
Firms 194 195 203 195 195 193
Adj. R2 0.063 0.052 0.060 0.16 0.17 0.069
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
continued on next page
51
Table 4 continued
Panel B: Alternative specifications
Model IV Va Vb Vc VIa VIb
market Matching Timing
leverage all propensity score no 74/75 dynamics
Treated x Post 0.044* 0.028** 0.053*** 0.053* 0.057***
(1.73) (2.00) (2.72) (1.89) (2.67)
Treated x Before−2y 0.0074
(0.84)
Treated x Before−1y 0.0099
(0.85)
Treated x After1y 0.054**
(2.55)
Treated x After2y+ 0.057***
(2.62)
Observations 1,349 2,679 1,218 641 1,056 1,380
Firms 195 376 156 85 203 203
Adj. R2 0.34 0.049 0.066 0.082 0.071 0.059
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
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Table 6
Interest rate
The dependent variable is spread of syndicated loans.
per stands for parity employee representation and equals
one for firms with parity codetermination. All models are
pooled OLS regressions. Independent variables are lagged
one period. All firm-years are considered. Deal controls
include purpose and amount. T-statistics based on Hu-
ber/White robust standard errors clustered by firms are
presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate signif-
icance on the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-levels, respectively. A
detailed description of all variables can be found in Ap-
pendix A.
Model I II III
PER -0.018*** -0.013*** -0.018***
(-3.38) (-3.05) (-3.52)
Leverage 0.00065 0.0050 0.0060
(0.090) (1.06) (0.86)
Size -0.0036** -0.0053*** -0.0018
(-2.51) (-4.62) (-1.54)
Tangibility -0.0050 0.00060 0.030**
(-0.58) (0.11) (2.45)
ROA -0.014 -0.017* -0.039**
(-0.54) (-1.79) (-2.42)
TobQind -0.0058 -0.00018 0.0042
(-1.41) (-0.11) (0.95)
Listing 0.00066 -0.00026 0.0028
(0.29) (-0.15) (1.17)
Z-score class -0.0019 -0.0013 -0.0027
(-0.70) (-0.80) (-1.45)
Observations 253 253 253
Firms 61 61 61
Adj. R2 0.37 0.59 0.63
Industry FE no no yes
Year FE no yes yes
Deal controls yes yes yes
Polynomial four four four
/ either side yes yes yes
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Table 7
Loan characteristics
The dependent variables is ln(maturity) in
Model Ia, maturity in Model Ib, and number of
covenants in Model II. per stands for parity em-
ployee representation and equals one for firms with
parity codetermination. All firm-years are consid-
ered. Model Ia is a pooled OLS regression; Mod-
els Ib and II are Poisson regressions. Independent
variables are lagged one period. Deal controls in-
clude purpose and amount. T-statistics based on
Huber/White robust standard errors clustered by
firms are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * in-
dicate significance on the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-levels,
respectively. A detailed description of all variables
can be found in Appendix A.
Model Ia Ib II
maturity covenants
PER 0.16* 0.16* -3.63**
(1.70) (1.71) (-2.21)
Leverage 0.094 -0.010 4.35
(0.44) (-0.055) (0.91)
Listing 0.090** 0.096*** 0.22
(2.60) (3.31) (0.45)
Size 0.41** 0.25* 10.2**
(2.23) (1.74) (2.29)
Tangibility 0.80* 0.66* 8.48
(1.85) (1.66) (0.82)
ROA 0.12 0.15 0.58
(0.94) (1.35) (0.55)
TobQind -0.072 -0.079 4.18**
(-1.18) (-1.56) (2.56)
Z-score class 0.0030 -0.0072 -1.58
(0.048) (-0.13) (-1.52)
Observations 733 733 761
Firms 132 132 133
Adj. R2 0.16 n/a n/a
Industry FE yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes
Deal controls yes yes yes
Polynomial four four four
/ either side yes yes yes
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Table 9
Stability and risk
The dependent variables are indicated in each column. per
stands for parity employee representation and equals one for firms
with parity codetermination. σ(cash flow) and σ(ROA) measure the
standard deviation of cash flow (scaled by total assets) and return on
assets over the past three fiscal years. σidio is a yearly measure for
idiosyncratic risk based on weekly equity returns. Firm-years with
between 1,500 and 2,500 domestic employees are included. Firms for
which per changes during the measurement period are not consid-
ered. Independent variables are as at the beginning of the measure-
ment period. Model II does not control for listing and accounting
standard because the sample for these estimations includes public
firms only for which these two variables both take the value of one.
All models are pooled OLS regressions. T-statistics based on Hu-
ber/White robust standard errors clustered by firms are presented
in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance on the 1%-, 5%-
and 10%-levels, respectively. A detailed description of all variables
can be found in Appendix A.
Model Ia Ib IIa IIb
accounting equity
σ(cash flow) σ(ROA) σidio. log(σidio.)
PER -0.025** -0.031* -0.072** -0.16*
(-2.08) (-1.84) (-2.15) (-1.84)
Leverage -0.0099 -0.021 0.081 0.019
(-0.69) (-1.33) (0.79) (0.086)
Size 0.0068* 0.010* -0.011 -0.039
(1.70) (1.79) (-0.60) (-0.98)
Tangibility -0.021 -0.016 -0.099 -0.33*
(-0.99) (-0.66) (-1.31) (-1.77)
ROA 0.21*** 0.21*** -0.46*** -1.37***
(3.63) (2.77) (-4.21) (-4.14)
TobQind -0.013 -0.025 -0.052 -0.12
(-0.86) (-1.22) (-1.19) (-1.02)
Sales growth -0.029** -0.025 -0.020 -0.012
(-2.18) (-1.35) (-0.51) (-0.11)
Listing 0.0030 0.015
(0.26) (1.13)
Acc. Std. -0.010 -0.016
(-0.78) (-1.10)
Observations 153 153 107 107
Firms 57 57 30 30
Adj. R2 0.51 0.49 0.67 0.69
Industry FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Polynomial four four four four
/ either side yes yes yes yes
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Appendix
Appendix A Definition of variables
Variable Description
Main variables
Leverage Total debt divided by total debt plus book value of equity. Total debt
includes current and long-term liabilities and excludes provisions and ac-
cruals. Source: Hoppenstedt (HS).
PER Dummy which equals one if the firm has parity employee representation.
Source: Hand-collected.
DE Number of domestic employees. Source: HS and hand-collected.
Treated Dummy which equals one for firms which introduced PER during the in-
troduction period of the codetermination law. Source: Hand-collected.
Postintr Dummy which equals one after 1979, i.e., after the end of the introduction
period of the law on codetermination.
Control variables
Size Natural logarithm of total assets in Mio e . Source: HS.
ROA Earnings scaled by total assets. Earnings before interest and taxes are used
for the RD sample. For the law introduction sample, we use net income
due to data constraints. Source: HS.
Tangibility Long-term tangible assets scaled by total assets. Source: HS.
TobQind Median of TobQ in an industry (based on the Fama/French 38 industries
classification) and year. TobQ is calculated as market value of equity
plus total liabilities divided by the sum of book value of equity and total
liabilities (wc08001+wc03351
wc03501+wc03351 ). Source: Own calculation based on WC.
Listing Dummy that equals one if shares of the firm are listed on any EU-regulated
or exchange-regulated market in Germany. Source: Hand-collected.
Acc. Std. Dummy that equals one if a firm applies international accounting stan-
dards. Source: HS.
Bank ownership
Bank Dummy which equals one if a bank holds voting rights of the company.
Source: own calculations based on HS.
Posttax Dummy which equals one after 2001.
PERpre Parity employee representation as before the tax reform (i.e., measured in
1999). Source: Hand-collected.
Free float Fraction of shares in free float. Source: HS.
Loan variables (source: Dealscan)
Spread Spread all-in-drawn.
Maturity Natural logarithm of deal maturity in months.
Covenants Number of covenants for the deal. If no information on covenants is avail-
abe, we set the variable to zero.
Amount Natural logarithm of the facility amount.
Purpose Dummy which equals one if primary purpose is “corporate purpose”.
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Definition of variables - continued
Variable Description
M&A deals (source: SDC Platinum)
M&A deal Dummy which equals one if a firm conducts an M&A deal.
# deals Number of M&A deals.
CAR Cumulative abnormal return around the announcement of a M&A deal.
Normal returns are estimated with a market model; the CDAX is used
as the market index. The estimation period is 200 trading days ending
two months before the announcement date. Events with fewer than 150
observations during the estimation period are not considered. The CAR is
measured during a symmetric three or five day window around the event.
CER Cumulative excess return. Excess return is defined as return above the
market index, i.e., the CDAX.
Diversifying deal Dummy which equals one if the firm acquires a target outside its main
business segment (as indicted by the SDC macro industry).
International deal Dummy which equals one if the target is located outside Germany.
Stability & risk
σ(cash flow) Standard deviation of cash flow scaled by total assets over the previous
three fiscal years. Cash flow is defined as sales minus total expenses plus
depreciation. Source: Own calculations based on HS.
σ(ROA) Standard deviation of ROA over the previous three fiscal years. Source:
Own calculations based on HS.
σidio Yearly measure for idiosyncratic risk (Panousi and Papanikolaou, 2012).
Calculated as volatility of weekly residuals. Residuals are obtained from a
regression of firm’s equity returns on the market return (CDAX). σidio for
firm i in year t is then calculated as σi,tidio =
√∑
2i,τ ; with i,τ being the
residual from the first regression in week τ . Equity returns are calculated
based changes of the Datastream item RI (return index) between week t-1
and t. Some adjustments are made for equity returns (i.e., deletion of all
observations with unadjusted price below one and observations where the
same price is reported for at least three consecutive weeks). Source: Own
calculations based on DS.
Other variables
Sales Growth Sales growth between year t and year t-1. Source: HS.
Z-Score class Z-Score is calculated as 0.717*x1 + 0.847*x2 + 3.107*x3 + 0.420*x4 +
0.998*x5 with x1 = short-term assets−short-term liabilitiestotal assets ; x2 =
retained earnings
total assets ;
x3 = EBITtotal assets ; x4 =
total equity
total liabilities ; x5 =
sales
total assets . Z-Score class equals
minus one if Z-Score is above 2.9, one if below 1.22, and zero if between
1.22 and 2.9. Source: Own calculations based on HS.
HS stands for Hoppenstedt, DS for Dealscan, and WC for Worldscope.
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